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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           
No. 07-4653
                           
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
      v.
BILLY CAULTON,
               Appellant
                           
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
District Court  No. 07-cr-00089
District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
                              
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 29, 2009
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 6, 2009)
                             
  OPINION
                             
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Billy Caulton pleaded guilty to possession and intent to distribute crack cocaine
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  The District Court sentenced Caulton to seventy-eight
months of imprisonment on December 6, 2007.  Caulton filed a timely notice of appeal on
    The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise1
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
2
December 13, 2007.   After reviewing the record in this case, Caulton’s counsel moved to1
withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
In Anders, the Supreme Court stated that the “constitutional requirement of
substantial equality and fair process” means that appellate counsel must act as an
advocate for the defendant.  386 U.S. at 744.  Thus, counsel’s 
role as advocate requires that he support his client’s appeal to the best of his
ability.  Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a
conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request
permission to withdraw.  That request must, however, be accompanied by a
brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal.  
Id.  As we explained in United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001), the
Anders brief must demonstrate that counsel has “thoroughly examined the record in
search of appealable issues,” and it must “explain why the issues are frivolous.” 
Accordingly, our inquiry is twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the
requirements of Anders; and (2) “whether an independent review of the record presents
any nonfrivolous issues.”  Id. (citing United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 (3d Cir.
2000)); see also Anders, 386 U.S. at 744 (explaining that the court must proceed, “after a
full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous”). 
If review fails to reveal any nonfrivolous issues, the court “may grant counsel’s request to
withdraw and dismiss the appeal.”  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
After considering counsel’s Anders brief, we are satisfied that he thoroughly
3
examined the record for issues of arguable merit and fulfilled the requirements of Anders. 
In fact, we commend counsel for his obvious attention to and consideration of the issues
presented.  Counsel correctly observed that, because Caulton pleaded guilty, Caulton’s
appeal is limited to the District Court’s jurisdiction, the validity of the guilty plea, and the
legality of the sentence.  United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570-75 (1989).  As
Caulton’s counsel noted, there is no basis for disputing the District Court’s jurisdiction.
With respect to the validity of Caulton’s guilty plea, counsel fully satisfied his
obligation under Anders.  He considered not only whether the guilty plea proceeding
complied with the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), but also
addressed each of the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.  Counsel
cited to the record to further demonstrate compliance with the obligations set forth in
Boykin and Rule 11.  
Counsel also conscientiously examined Caulton’s sentence.  Prior to sentencing,
Caulton’s trial counsel objected to the sentencing range on the ground that the
government had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt the quantity of cocaine base
possessed by Caulton.  During the sentencing hearing, the District Court heard argument
on this issue.  After discussing and considering two lab reports, the District Court found
that Caulton possessed 94.4 grams of cocaine base.  Before this Court, counsel correctly
noted that the District Court was permitted to make such findings by a preponderance of
the evidence under United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
Our independent review of the record confirms that the District Court had sufficient
    We note that, consistent with Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) of the Third Circuit,2
counsel advised Caulton of his intention to file an Anders brief and that Caulton was
entitled to file a pro se brief.  Caulton did not file a pro se brief raising any other issues.   
4
evidence to support its finding and computation of Caulton’s sentencing range. 
In sum, we agree with counsel’s assessment of Caulton’s appeal.   Our own2
independent review of the record fails to reveal any nonfrivolous issues for appeal. 
Accordingly, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and will affirm the judgment of
the District Court entered on December 6, 2007.  We certify that the issues presented in
the appeal lack legal merit and thus do not require the filing of a petition for writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court.  3d Cir. LAR 109.2(b).
